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Abstract 
The article discusses a critical realist interpretation of evolutionary growth theorising by 
focusing on some of its basic characteristics. The evolutionary ontology is complex, 
differentiated, structured, systemic, open, ever-changing, and radically uncertain. Its 
methodology tends to be increasingly based on appreciative theorising, retroductive 
explanations and interdisciplinary analysis. After discussing these features, the article 
suggests that critical realism may indeed constitute an important philosophical and 
methodological foundation for the future development of evolutionary theories of 
economic growth. 
 
Key words: Critical realism, evolutionary economics, innovation, economic growth 
JEL classification: B41, B52, O30 
 
                                            
1. Introduction 
 
Critical realism is a philosophical approach to sciences (Bhaskar, 1978, 1979 and 1986) 
that criticises the study of the social domain as a ‘closed’ system, typical of positivist 
approaches in the social sciences. At the same time, it opposes the idea that the reality 
can simply be reduced to our interpretation of it, as it has been argued in different forms 
in the past by idealist and conventionalist scholars.  
The most important point of critical realism is the shift of focus back to ontology. 
According to this view, the reality is complex, but it cannot be reduced to our 
interpretation of it. It does exist, and it is composed by three interrrelated levels: (i) the 
real (deep) level of structures and generative mechanisms; (ii) the actual level of events 
and states of affairs; (iii) the empirical level of observed phenomena, perceptions and 
impressions. According to Bhaskar (1991, p.458),  
 
the objects of scientific thought are real structures irreducible to the events they generate. 
 
Critical realism has been recently explored in economics by Lawson (1989, 1997, 1998, 
and 2001), Fleetwood (1999) and Lewis (2004).1 In the economic domain, critical 
realism points to the main limitations of neoclassical economics, and it provides a 
philosophical and methodological foundation for a broad set of alternative approaches. 
In a Special Issue of this Journal, in particular, critical realism has been discussed as a 
possible foundation for neo-Marxist (Nielsen, 2002), and Post Keynesian economics 
(Lee, 2002).  
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In this recent surge of interest, though, the connections between critical realism and 
evolutionary economics have seldom been explored. The only exceptions in this respect 
are the contributions of Foss (1994), Vromen (1995), Northover (1999) and Lawson 
(2003). According to them, there exists a strict connection between the evolutionary 
theory of economic change, whose modern version traces back to Nelson and Winter’s 
seminal work (1982), and the philosophy of critical realism. However, these previous 
works also point to possible problems in interpreting evolutionary growth theorising 
from a critical realist perspective, particularly in relation to the co-existence of realist 
and positivist features in Nelson and Winter’s distinction between ‘formal’ and 
‘appreciative’ theorising (Northover, 1999). 
Based on these previous contributions, the present article discusses a critical realist 
interpretation of evolutionary theories of economic change. The overall purpose of the 
discussion is to answer the question: can critical realism constitute a philosophical and 
methodological foundation for evolutionary growth theorising? The article differs from 
previous works in one important respect, as it adopts a broader definition of 
evolutionary economics that does not only refer to Nelson and Winter’s original work, 
but also includes other closely related research traditions, such as the neo-
Schumpeterian theory of long waves, the technology-gap approach to the study of 
catching up and falling behind, and the systems of innovation framework.  
There now exists a large consensus on the fact that the different strands of evolutionary 
economics flourished in the last two decades can be regarded as different research 
traditions within the same (broadly defined) evolutionary paradigm. Section 2 will 
provide a brief overview of these different strands of evolutionary growth theorising by 
focusing on their theoretical common core. The adoption of a broader definition of 
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evolutionary economics is relevant for our discussion of the critical realist foundations 
of the evolutionary approach, because it shows that appreciative theorising and 
qualitative research methods are taking an increasingly important role for the 
development of the evolutionary paradigm, while the original emphasis on Nelson and 
Winter-like formal modelling is gradually loosing ground.  
It is such a broadly conceived evolutionary economic paradigm that the article will 
interpret from a critical realist perspective. The paper will argue two interrelated theses. 
The first (section 3) is that the evolutionary ontology is strictly related to the philosophy 
of critical realism. The evolutionary ontology describes in fact an economic reality that 
is complex, differentiated, structured, systemic, open, ever-changing, and radically 
uncertain, and these attributes suggest an implicit but strong connection to the critical 
realist ontology. 
Such an ontology has important methodological implications. The second thesis (section 
4) will argue that the methodology prevailingly used by modern evolutionary 
economists shares important similarities with a critical realist methodology. These 
connections will be outlined by pointing to the increasing use that evolutionary 
economics makes of interdisciplinary analysis and appreciative theorising, and the 
related (implicit) adoption of a retroductive mode of explanation. These aspects of the 
evolutionary methodology, and their interpretation from a critical realist perspective, 
will make it possible to reconsider the relationship between qualitative and quantitative 
research, as well as that between formal and appreciative theorising, in light of recent 
developments in the evolutionary field (e.g. history-friendly models).  
On the whole, the discussion will suggest that evolutionary growth theorising is 
increasingly moving in a critical realist direction, and that critical realism does indeed 
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constitute an appropriate philosophical and methodological foundation for the future 
development of evolutionary economics.    
 
 
2. Evolutionary growth theorising 
 
The usefulness of the biological evolution metaphor for economic science was pointed 
out more than a century ago by Veblen and Marshall, but the development of modern 
evolutionary economics is relatively recent. It goes back to 1982, which could be set as 
the initial year of the revival of the evolutionary approach. This was in fact the year 
when some of the most important contributions in the field were published, by Dosi, 
Freeman, Nelson and Winter, and Rosenberg. Since then, evolutionary growth 
theorising has rapidly advanced.  
There now exists a large consensus on the fact that the different strands of evolutionary 
economics flourished in the last two decades may be regarded as different research 
traditions within the same (broadly defined) evolutionary paradigm. This is what 
argued, in somewhat different forms, by most of the recent critical surveys of the field, 
such as the ones by Hodgson (1993), Andersen (1994), Nelson (1995 and 1998), Nelson 
and Winter (2002), Fagerberg (2003), and Verspagen (2005). According to these 
contributions, there is a common core linking together the different streams of 
evolutionary growth theorising. Taking a similar point of view, this section provides a 
brief overview of the field, in order to outline the main characteristics constituting the 
building blocks of evolutionary economics. 
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2.1 Heterogeneity, selection and innovation 
In evolutionary growth theory, heterogeneity (or variety) of economic agents is the 
necessary starting point to understand the complexities associated with the process of 
growth and transformation in the long run (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Individuals 
follow routines and habits of thought in their economic activities. Routines are 
conceived as the counterpart of genes in biological evolution. They are in fact embodied 
in individuals’ minds and in organizations’ production activities; they greatly differ 
among the various units of the population; and they can be transmitted from one 
economic agent to another, thus explaining a rather stable and inertial pattern of 
production over time. Routine-guided firms2 may then be regarded as the counterpart of 
phenotypes in biological evolution, because their behaviour is the result of the 
development of their genetic endowment (individual skills and organizational routines) 
in a given economic and institutional environment.  
Evolutionary theories are therefore based on the idea that routinized productive 
activities carried out by a population of heterogeneous firms may generate a relatively 
stable pattern of economic activities and relationships over time. But such inertial forces 
and tendencial persistency are continuously counteracted by dynamic forces which push 
the economic system towards evolution, change and transformation. These dynamic 
forces are technological competition and selection, on the one hand, and innovation on 
the other. 
In the evolutionary metaphor, in the same way as animal species compete for their 
survival in the natural environment, heterogeneous firms compete in the market by 
trying to employ more advanced techniques, and to produce goods characterized by 
lower costs and better quality than those commercialized by their competitors. The idea 
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of selection-based growth, put forward in different forms in the past by Schumpeter 
(1934 and 1939), Alchian (1951) and Winter (1964 and 1971), is represented by modern 
evolutionary scholars by assuming that the selection mechanism typically depends on 
the profits realized by each firm. Firms which are able to obtain high profits tend to 
increase their market shares over time. Other firms, with inferior technological 
capabilities, realize lower profits, tend to loose market shares, and will ultimately be 
driven out of the market. 
Over time, competition and selection tend to consume and to reduce the initial 
heterogeneity, so that if there was no source of creation of new variety the process of 
evolution would soon come to an end (Metcalfe, 1998). The fundamental point about 
the evolutionary economic world is precisely that there is a permanent and ongoing 
introduction of novelty, so that heterogeneity and variety are continuously renewed, and 
evolution is a never ending process.  
Innovation, thus, is the core of evolutionary growth theories. Many feedbacks and 
complex interactions are involved in the creation of technical and organizational 
innovations. Interactions continuously arise between individuals within the same firm, 
between different firms, between producers and users of the new technology, between 
public and private organizations. At the end of the 1980s, it was increasingly recognised 
that such complex links could not be investigated within a linear framework, and a 
systemic approach to the study of innovation was developed (Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 
1992; Nelson, 1993, Edquist, 1997).  
The systemic perspective focuses on the complexities of the innovative process, and on 
the dynamic, cumulative and inherently uncertain nature of knowledge accumulation. 
This framework considers these complexities not simply from the point of view of the 
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individual firm, but rather by focusing on the feedbacks and interactions between the 
various components of the system, including the users of new technologies, public 
organizations and, more generally, the institutional context. Innovations and learning 
are collective phenomena, they can hardly be understood without considering the 
complex interactions between heterogeneous economic agents (Lundvall, 1992). The 
systems of innovation approach constitutes then a general framework useful to 
investigate the innovative process at different levels of analysis, as shown by recent 
overviews of the literature on sectoral (Malerba, 2002 and 2005), regional (Asheim and 
Gertler, 2005) and national (Edquist, 2005) systems of innovation. 
 
2.2 Neo-Schumpeterian long waves 
The dynamic interactions between heterogeneity, selection and innovation can be used 
to interpret some of the ideas of the ‘appreciative’ neo-Schumpeterian literature in an 
evolutionary context (Verspagen, 2005). Greatly inspired by Schumpeter’s book 
Business Cycles (1939), the modern strand of neo-Schumpeterian theory focuses on the 
importance of basic (radical) innovations in determining long wave patterns of 
macroeconomic growth (Freeman, Clark and Soete, 1982; Freeman, 1983, 1984 and 
1987; Freeman and Loucã, 2001; Perez, 1983). The history of technology since the 
Industrial Revolution shows that radical innovations have often been clustered in time, 
strictly interrelated, and pervasive on many sectors of the economy. Such families of 
interrelated basic innovations have been termed “technological systems” (Freeman et 
alia, 1982), or “technological paradigms” (Dosi, 1982), or “technological styles” (Perez, 
1983).  
When a new technological paradigm arises, there is a big impulse in the techno-
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economic system to adopt the new best practice technology due to the high profit 
prospects related to it. However, the techno-economic system is by its own nature more 
rapid to adopt changes, while the socio-institutional one may take some time before 
implementing the changes associated with the new technological style. The mismatch 
between the two systems may retard the large scale introduction of the new paradigm, 
precisely because some social, organizational and institutional changes are necessary 
before it can diffuse to the whole economy. As time goes by, the socio-institutional 
system evolves, the ‘harmonic complementarity’ between the two systems is restored, 
and a new ‘mode of development’ sets in. This may lead to a long wave pattern very 
similar to the business cycle described by Schumpeter (1939). This is characterized at 
first, during the upswing and prosperity phases of the long run cycle, by a rapid 
diffusion of the new paradigm, incremental innovations over its natural trajectory 
(Nelson and Winter, 1977), and an intensive process of creative destruction. Later, after 
some decades, it is marked by increased competition and market saturation, decline of 
profits, and the recession and depression phases.  
In the attempt to interpret such neo-Schumpeterian long waves theory in an evolutionary 
framework, the main challenge ahead for evolutionary scholars is to investigate the 
microeconomic process that may explain the co-evolution between technological and 
socio-institutional changes at the macroeconomic level. In fact, while institutional and 
organizational changes are often regarded as fundamental elements of the approach, the 
evolutionary explanation of the dynamic interactions between organizational routines 
and aggregate institutions, and of their coevolution, is still unclear.  
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2.3 Why growth rates differ?  
The evolutionary metaphor has also been recently used to address the old question: 
“why do growth rates differ between countries in the long run?”. The purpose of some 
evolutionary works (Chiaromonte and Dosi, 1993; Dosi and Fabiani, 1994; Dosi et alia, 
1994) is in fact to build up evolutionary microfounded models able to reproduce some 
of the macro stylised facts on catching up and falling behind, convergence and 
divergence, in the attempt to bridge the gap with the previous strand of technology-gap 
studies.3
Originating from historically oriented studies on the experience of catching up and 
overtaking of some advanced countries in the last two centuries (Veblen, 1915; 
Gerschenkron, 1962; Landes, 1969; Abramovitz, 1986 and 1994, Freeman, 1987), the 
modern strand of technology-gap theory has developed since the 1980s. The applied 
works in this tradition try to explain cross-country differences in economic growth rates 
and trade performance by using indicators of national technological activities, such as 
R&D and patent statistics. The strong correlations generally found between 
technological and macroeconomic performances (Fagerberg, 1987; Dosi, Pavitt and 
Soete, 1990) are then taken as an indication that international trade and economic 
growth follow disequilibrium and discontinuous paths, whose main determinants are the 
creation and diffusion of technologically advanced processes and products. 
Following Cornwall (1977), Abramovitz (1986 and 1994), Fagerberg (1987 and 1994) 
and Verspagen (1991), the main idea of the technology-gap approach is that innovation 
and the international diffusion of new technologies are the main sources of cross-
country differences in growth rates. Follower countries have a technology-gap (or 
technological distance) from the leader country, and they can therefore exploit their 
 9
backward position by imitating and using advanced technologies developed by the 
leader, instead of creating them from scratch.  
However, the process of imitation and diffusion of new technologies is costly, it 
requires the existence of social and institutional capabilities that not all the follower 
countries have. This explains why catching up and convergence are not automatic and 
common outcomes, but rather uncertain and uncommon ones. In particular, Abramovitz 
(1994) has pointed out that countries persistently differ with regard to their 
‘technological congruences’ and their ‘social capabilities’. Such techno-economic and 
socio-institutional sets of factors greatly differ between countries in each technological 
paradigm, and these structural differences may explain why some countries manage to 
succesfully catch up with the technological leader in a given historical age, while some 
others fall behind. 
The challenge ahead for evolutionary scholars is to provide a more in-depth 
evolutionary explanation of the microeconomic process which is consistent with such 
applied technology-gap macroeconomic studies. As recognised by Dosi (1997, p.1544),  
 
still there is a long way to go in order to incorporate path-dependent learning, micro heterogeneity, out-
of-equilibrium inteactions, etc. into a robust aggregate story of trade, growth, international convergence, 
divergence, forging ahead and falling behind.  
 
There is still a long way to go, but the direction to be taken by future macroevolutionary 
studies has already been pointed out. 
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3. The evolutionary ontology 
 
The previous section has presented a brief overview of some of the different streams of 
evolutionary growth theorising developed in the last two decades, thus showing what 
constitutes the theoretical common core of the evolutionary paradigm, and some of the 
main challenges for future research. The view that there is a theoretical common 
foundation at the basis of the evolutionary paradigm is now increasingly shared by most 
evolutionary scholars (e.g. Hodgson, 1993; Nelson and Winter, 2002; Fagerberg, 2003).  
This leads to the question: does there also exist a philosophical and methodological 
common core of the evolutionary paradigm? The investigation of the philosophical and 
methodological features of evolutionary growth theorising needs to complement the 
development of its theoretical concepts, but so far the former have been studied much 
less than the latter.  
Foss (1994), Vromen (1995), Northover (1999) and Lawson (2003) have previously 
suggested that the philosophy and methodology of science behind the evolutionary 
theory of economic change point to important connections with critical realism. 
Building on these previous contributions, and discussing such a critical realist 
interpretation of evolutionary growth theorising, this section focuses on the ontology 
described by evolutionary scholars, and section 4 will consider the related 
methodological aspects. 
 
3.1 Complex, differentiated and structured reality 
In what sense can the evolutionary ontology be interpreted from a critical realist 
perspective? The evolutionary economic world is complex and differentiated. It is 
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composed by a population of heterogeneous individuals, firms, sectors and countries 
which fundamentally differ between each other. Variety is an essential characteristic of 
the economic ‘open’ system, and it is continually reproduced and transformed at 
different levels of analysis. At the microeconomic level, the mechanisms of formation 
and change of habits of thought and routines greatly differ between individuals and 
between firms (Nelson and Winter, 1982). The same is true with regards to the 
fundamental heterogeneity in the structural characteristics and innovative patterns in 
different sectors of the economy (as emphasized by neo-Schumpeterians and, more 
recently, by the sectoral systems of innovation literature4), and in different countries (as 
it is the case in the technology-gap literature, Fagerberg, 1994). An evolutionary and 
systemic perspective is therefore implicitly based on ‘population thinking’ (Hodgson, 
1993), because variety is an intrinsic characteristic of the ontology at different levels of 
analysis. 
Now, persistent heterogeneity implicitly introduces complexity and differentiation. In 
fact, if all of the economic agents (sectors, countries) had the same learning and 
innovative capabilities, innovation could simply be studied by defining the behavior of a 
representative agent (sector, country), and there would be no need of an evolutionary 
perspective. It would be a simpler story. In this case, reality could simply be conceived 
as the aggregation of homogenous and atomistic entities, and no complexity and 
differentiation would arise.  
On the other hand, the evolutionary ontology is fundamentally and persistently 
complex, because learning and innovation are interactive phenomena introduced by 
heterogeneous firms which operate in heterogenous sectors and countries. Typological 
thinking and mere aggregation of individual entities, then, are of no help to the 
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evolutionary researcher. Population thinking and the study of ‘complex evolving 
systems’ (Metcalfe, 2001) are necessary to investigate such an ontology. 
The evolutionary world is not just complex and differentiated, it is also structured. 
What consitutes the structure, that is the real (deep) level of generative mechanisms, is 
not simply the existence of heterogeneous agents per se, but rather the 
interdependencies and relationships among them. This is the core of the systemic 
perspective: innovation is a social phenomenon, it can only be investigated by looking 
at the interactions between firms, users of new technologies and public organizations 
within a given institutional, sectoral and national context (Lundvall, 1992, Nelson, 
1993). This seems to fit Lawson’s critical realist description of the social realm as  
 
very highly internally related or holistic. [...] society emerges as a highly internally-related phenomenon. 
It is indeed an internally-related position-practice system into which agents essentially slot through the 
collective actions of such agents, is continually reproduced and/or transformed through practice (Lawson, 
2001, p.174).  
 
3.2  Transformational model of social action 
As the above quotation points out, critical realism argues that there is a strict link 
between the agents and the structure in which they exist. The social structure pre-exists 
individual existence, but it is reproduced and transformed by the same individual power 
of agency (praxis). Individuals do not create society, but they reproduce and transform 
it. They are active agents in a complex world. By using Lawson’s words (2001, p.174),  
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social structure, then, is both condition and consequence of human activity [...]. Social being, then, is 
inherently dynamic; it is a transformative process in motion. In critical realism this is systematised as the 
transformational conception of social activity. 
 
Such a transformational model of social action (Bhaskar, 1979) tends to be discussed, 
and implicitly adopted, in evolutionary economics. A rather similar position to the 
structure-agency dilemma is in fact adopted by the Veblerian principle of ‘non-
reductionism’, which according to Hodgson (1993) constitutes one of the major 
foundations of the evolutionary theory. In this respect, inspired by Veblen (1919), 
Hodgson suggests that the concepts of ‘habits of thought’ and ‘institutions’ constitute 
the basic units of analysis necessary to link agents and structure in a more systematic 
and dynamic way (Hodgson, 1998a).5  
According to this view, agents have a fundamental capacity for choice, and this makes 
the social system essentially ‘open’ (Lawson, 1997). However, individual agency 
cannot be understood independently of the social structure in which it is embedded. 
Individual habits and firms’ routines are then the basic units of evolutionary 
microeconomic analysis, but they are in turn shaped and affected by the macroeconomic 
and institutional environment in which economic agents live. ‘Co-evolution’ across 
different levels of analysis is thus called for, evolutionary theory tends to be non-
reductionist in that the micro and macro levels of analysis co-exist and interact. 
Northover (1999, p.51) observes that Nelson and Winter describe  
 
an essentially transformational ontology, in which agents are neither creators nor mere bearers of 
structure. 
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Following their seminal contribution, most modern evolutionary scholars point to the 
importance of investigating the co-evolution between micro, meso and macroeconomic 
levels. This is particularly evident in studies of systems of innovation, which consider 
how the innovative activity of private and public organizations is affected and shaped 
by the production structure, the macroeconomic conditions and the socio-institutional 
system of the country. In turn, the national patterns of innovation and economic growth 
are considered to be determined by the learning and searching activities of (micro) 
economic agents. However, while in verbal and appreciative evolutionary studies the 
principle of non-reductionism has more often been adopted, the interactions between 
different levels of analysis have not yet been introduced in a systematic way in the more 
formal strand of evolutionary modelling.6  
 
3.3 Change, dynamics and evolution 
According to critical realism, then, the purpose of the economist is  
 
to develop ways of uncovering causal mechanisms in a seemingly quintessentially open, as well as 
intrinsically dynamic, and highly internally related, social reality (Lawson, 2001, p.175).  
 
We have already pointed out the ‘open’ and ‘internally related’ properties of the 
evolutionary economic system. The other fundamental characteristic suggested by 
Lawson is its intrinsically dynamic character. The critical realist focus on change and 
transformation has in fact been a basic foundation of the evolutionary economic view 
much before critical realism was originally applied to economics. Hodgson (1993) 
shows that the theories of economic change of classical authors such as Smith, Spencer, 
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Marx, Veblen and Schumpeter are all, in different forms, closely related to the 
evolutionary perspective. 
In the revival of evolutionary economics since Nelson and Winter’s (1982) book, the 
study of qualitative change and transformations has always been at the centre of the 
analysis. Evolutionary economics is, by its own nature, about dynamics and change. The 
heart of the evolutionary process is innovation, novelty, transformation. In modern 
evolutionary studies, technical and organizational innovations are the result of complex 
interactions between private firms, public organizations and users of new technologies 
within a given macroeconomic and institutional framework. Innovation partly depends 
on ‘learning’ (an automatic consequence of the production process), and partly on 
‘exploring’ (a deliberate effort to search for new technical solutions by the science and 
technology system). Therefore, current evolutionary theories of innovation point to the 
importance of both radical and incremental innovations. They present an explanation of 
technical and organizational changes that may be able to combine the neo-
Schumpeterian focus on radical innovations with Nelson and Winter’s stress on learning 
and incremental changes.  
In the evolutionary ontology, therefore, economic growth is a complex process in which 
‘saltationist’ and ‘gradualist’ dynamics can be reconciled (Hodgson, 1993). The 
economic reality is complex, it cannot be represented as a uniform-speed transitional 
movement towards a steady state. Incremental learning and radical innovations co-exist, 
and history must then be conceived as a process of qualitative change in which 
saltationist and gradualist dynamics live together. Gradual and disruptive changes are 
both real aspects of the economic world, and they continuously transform the economic 
open system. Economic growth is a never-ending and ever-changing process, not a 
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simple transition towards a steady state. The shift in perspective is remarkable: the focus 
is not on universal and constant conjuctions of events in a closed system, as in 
positivism, but on continuous change and transformations in an open one, as in critical 
realism. 
The coexistence of random and systematic factors driving economic evolution (Nelson, 
1995; Silverberg and Verspagen, 2003), and the combination of inertial and dynamic 
forces, both constitute important elements in the attempt to explain the most important 
stylised facts about economic evolution. Such stylised facts are the existence of 
structural change (the old Schumpeterian ‘creative destruction’), persistent differences 
in growth rates between regions and countries, phenomena of path dependency, and 
cumulative causation patterns. Such real phenomena are regarded as unique events in 
historical time. Differently from the neoclassical metaphor of a steady state, 
evolutionary scholars describe an ever-changing and never-ending process of growth 
and transformation. 
 
3.4 Causality and uncertainty 
As a consequence, the notion of causality differs as well. A conjuction of events can 
never be constant in an open system in continuous transformation. In such a complex, 
structured, differentiated and ever-changing world, a generating mechanism will not 
necessarily always produce the same event. Therefore, empirical regularities are neither 
sufficient nor necessary for establishing causal laws (‘ubiquity determinism’, Smith, 
1998). At a deep level, there does exist an evolutionary process generating the observed 
stylised facts of economic growth, but this process does not link causes and effects in a 
deterministic and mechanistic simple way. ‘Strong’ and pervasive uncertainty is an 
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intrinsic characteristic of the evolutionary ontology (Dosi, 1982). Economic growth is a 
non-predictable and non-deterministic process because fundamental sources of 
uncertainty exist in a complex, structured and ever-changing evolutionary system.  
In Nelson and Winter-like formal models, uncertain and non-deterministic innovative 
activity is commonly represented by assuming that the arrival rate of innovation follows 
a stochastic process. This kind of formalization is disappointing from a critical realist 
perspective. It appears more suitable to describe the computable risk-environment 
typical of neoclassical economics, rather than the pervasive uncertainty of the 
evolutionary world. In the appreciative and non formal type of evolutionary studies, on 
the other hand, the pervasive nature of uncertainty is more clearly pointed out, and a 
distinction between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ uncertainty is made.  
The studies of systems of innovation, of neo-Schumpeterian long waves, and of 
catching up provide some examples of the important role played by uncertainty in  
appreciative evolutionary studies at the macroeconomic level. The process of long run 
growth, and its consequences in terms of catching up and falling behind, are conceived 
as non-deterministic and non-predictable. In fact, given that technological change is a 
fundamentally and radically uncertain phenomenon, it is not possible to predict what 
kind of technological system will prevail in the future. It is therefore hard to say which 
countries will be in a better position to make a more rapid and more widespread use of 
the new technological paradigm. As Abramovitz (1986 and 1994) pointed out, social 
capability may explain persistent patterns in the national creation and accumulation of 
knowledge, but cross-country differences in technological congruence may greatly 
change in different historical phases, thus introducing an element of unpredictability and 
radical uncertainty in the catching-up process.  
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 4. The evolutionary methodology 
 
Our discussion has so far pointed to the existence of important similarities between 
evolutionary theories of economic growth and the philosophy of critical realism mainly 
from an ontological point of view. When we turn to the methodological level, other 
fundamental connections emerge. 
 
4.1 Searching for the evolutionary process 
In evolutionary economics, an implicit connection to the methodology of critical realism 
is reflected in the repeatedly claimed search for the process which has generated 
economic growth and transformation in a specific historical and geographical context. 
According to Hodgson (1998b, p.164),  
 
the challenge provided by evolutionary economists is not only theoretical but ontological, epistemological 
and methodological. The stress on ontology coincides with a general movement in philosophy back 
towards matters of ontological grounding that were dismissed as ‘metaphysical’ in the era of logical 
positivism.  
 
The often quoted sentence “inside the black box” (Rosenberg, 1982) has been taken by 
scholars of technological change as a methodological imperative not to stop at the 
superficial level of observing empirical evidence, but to go towards a deeper level by 
searching for the evolutionary process which has generated that empirical substance. 
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Northover (1999, p.50) argues that in Nelson and Winter’s theory of economic change 
we find  
 
a committment to methodological realism, and, relatedly, a transcendental (metaphysical) realism [...]. A 
belief in an external and structured world, which is capable of being known drawing on antecedent 
cognitive materials (metaphors, analogies and the like), and which is irreducible to any individual’s 
consciousness. 
  
Such a committment to the real (deep) level defines the main purpose of evolutionary 
scholars, which is to investigate the underlying generative mechanism (evolutionary 
process) that has determined economic growth and transformation in a given historical 
and geographical situation. Differently from the positivist attempt to find out a universal 
law or model, typical of mainstream economics, evolutionary scholars tend to recognise 
the complexity of the economy as an open system, and its immanent transformational 
feature. The committment to the investigation of reality is then combined with the 
acknowledgement of its complex, ever-changing and non-deterministic character, so 
that causal mechanisms are investigated but can never be formalized in terms of 
universal laws or models.  
According to this realist interpretation, the necessary starting point for evolutionary 
analysis must be the historical and institutional specificities in which any economic 
explanation must be rooted. Lawson would call such a starting point a ‘demi-reg’ (or 
stylised fact), that is  
 
a partial event regularity which prima facie indicates the occasional, but less than universal, actualization 
of a mechanism or tendency, over a definite region of time-space (Lawson, 1997, p.204).  
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 In evolutionary terms, variability and heterogeneity (across sectors, countries, core 
technologies, and historical phases) cannot be simply explained as a deviation from a 
universal model. They constitute indeed the fundamental starting point of the analysis, 
an intrinsic characteristic of the economic world.  
But once the stylised fact is pointed out and the object of the analysis is identified, how 
can its generative mechanism be investigated? 
 
4.2 Retroductive model of explanation 
In the search for causal explanations and generative mechanisms, the fundamental 
aspects of the critical realist methodology are constituted by both the empirical analysis 
and the researcher’s theoretical interpretation of it. Both of them constitute necessary 
and inseparable steps in the investigation of the deep (real) level. As such, there is a 
close connection between theoretical and empirical work in critical realism, both of 
them are necessary but neither is sufficient.  
Empirical work aims at identifying demi-regs, with special emphasis on those 
contrastive patterns that generate surprise and raise the interest of the researcher. The 
methodology of contrastive demi-regs (Lawson, 1997) consists of using empirical 
analysis to formulate the question: if the unit of analysis X is in many respects similar to 
the unit Y, why has X led to a different outcome than Y, contrary to what it would have 
been reasonable to expect? The major purpose of empirical research is thus to identify 
interesting contrastive demi-regs that constitute the fundamental starting point of the 
analysis.  
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Once the research question is identified and posed, theoretical analysis then tries to put 
forward an answer to it, in the attempt to explore the generative mechanism that may 
explain a given contrastive pattern in a given historical-geographic context. Theoretical 
reasoning, in the critical realist methodology, is an abstract body of work, where the 
term abstract does not imply the use of formal deductive reasoning leading to the 
identification of a universal regularity - ‘whenever this then that’ - but it rather refers to 
the attempt to focus on a partial event regularity with the purpose of laying down a 
context-dependent and far-from-universal causal explanation of it (see Lawson, 1997, 
chapter 16). This abstract body of reasoning leads to the suggestion that a given 
generative mechanism may explain a certain contrastive pattern - i.e. the possible reason 
why the unit of analysis X has led to a different outcome than the unit Y. But this, in 
turn, calls for further subsequent empirical research to investigate whether this 
explanation is plausible in other contrastive situations as well. There thus exists a 
continuous process of interaction and give-and-take between theoretical and empirical 
work, and no clear cut separation can be drawn between them. 
A related important aspect of the critical realist methodology is the relationship between 
qualitative and quantitative empirical analysis. The former plays inequivocably a crucial 
role, due to the deep and context-dependent insights on real processes that case study-
based research makes it possible to achieve. The role of quantitative methods, on the 
contrary, is the matter of an interesting ongoing debate in critical realism (e.g. Pratten, 
2005). In general terms, critical realists look with suspicion at the mainstream use of 
statistical and econometric analysis, particularly when these are used as positivist tools 
for inferring universal causal laws from empirical facts, and for predicting future states 
of events based on those causal laws. Econometric exercises, it is argued, inevitably 
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imply the attempt to create experimental conditions by artificially closing the economic 
inherently open system, and this constitutes the major problem with the use of 
quantitative methods in economics (Lawson, 1997).  
It is however possible to adopt a more open position in this respect, and argue that 
statistical and econometric analysis may indeed constitute useful complements to 
qualitative research, to the extent that they are more cautiously interpreted than what is 
frequently done in mainstream applied economics (Downward et alia, 2002). A more 
cautious interpretation means that the results of, say, an econometric estimation should 
not be taken as the demonstration of the existence of a universal causal relationship 
linking a variable to a set of others, but rather as the identification of a context-
dependent pattern of correlation between them. This pattern of correlation constitutes in 
fact a partial event regularity, a demi-reg, a stylized fact, which should subsequently be 
explained by means of theoretical abstract reasoning. In this view, close in spirit to the 
current practice of evolutionary applied studies, econometrics may be used as a tool for 
identifying interesting demi-regs, but it does not imply any causal explanation of them. 
The methodology of contrastive demi-regs discussed above would in fact be consistent 
with such an interpretation of econometric work. Suppose that the results of a regression 
analysis robustly indicates that the variable X is correlated to the variable Y in the 
population A but not in the (similar) population B. This would lead critical realists to 
ask: what is the generative mechanism that may explain such a contrastive pattern in the 
two populations? The results of regression analysis may thus lead to the formulation of 
this type of research questions, but it cannot per se provide the answer.   
The above discussion is relevant because these two important methodological aspects of 
critical realism (the strict link between theory and applied work, and the debated 
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possibility to combine quantitative and qualitative research) also constitute fundamental 
characteristics of the methodology prevailingly adopted by evolutionary economists 
(Foss, 1994; Vromen, 1995). The evolutionary view tends to combine qualitative 
analysis required by technological, economic and institutional history with the statistical 
and econometric techniques used by applied economists. Differently from the ‘covering 
law model of explanation’, typically adopted in mainstream economic analysis, there is 
no clear-cut separation between theory and applied work in evolutionary growth 
theorising. 
The concept of appreciative theorising (Nelson and Winter, 1982) constitutes the link 
between theory and applied work, between quantitative and qualitative methods. 
According to Nelson (1994, p.292): 
 
appreciative theorizing tends to be close to empirical work and provides both guidance and interpretation. 
Mostly it is expressed verbally and is the analyst’s articulation of what he or she thinks really is going on. 
Appreciative theorizing is very much an abstract body of reasoning. Certain variables and relationships 
are treated as important, and others are ignored. There generally is explicit causal argument. However, 
appreciative theorising tends to stay close to the empirical substance. 
 
In the attempt to put forward a causal explanation behind an observed phenomenon 
without the exclusive use of deductive reasoning and mathematical formalizations, 
evolutionary economists implicitly use what critical realists call retroduction, that is a 
non-deductive movement from some stylised facts to the underlying mechanism which 
may have generated them. The movement from the empirical evidence to the 
unobservable generating process can be neither inductive nor deductive, because the 
evolutionary ontology is complex, stratified, differentiated, uncertain and in permanent 
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transformation. In the study of an evolutionary open system, then, a retroductive model 
of explanation is in fact implicitly adopted, in which what matters is “the analyst’s 
articulation of what he or she thinks really is going on”. Retroduction is the way in 
which appreciative theorising is developed, thus constituting the necessary link between 
theory and applied work, between quantitative and qualitative analysis of economic 
growth. 
In the last two decades, different strands of evolutionary growth theory have recognised 
the importance of, and implicitly adopted, an appreciative kind of theorising. Freeman 
et alia (1982, p.ix) describe the methodological attitude of neo-Schumpeterians by 
stating that  
 
statistical analysis must be complemented by economic, social and technological history, if it is to 
illuminate the real processes of change which we are trying to interpret. This is why we have rejected a 
purely econometric approach to the problem. On the other hand, a purely descriptive anecdotal historical 
analysis is inadequate without some attempt to measure the overall trends in the economy and the 
principal components. Our method, therefore, is one of reasoned history.  
 
In a similar way, the macroevolutionary contributions on catching up and falling behind 
(i.e. the technology-gap approach) tend to adopt a methodology which presents a 
combination of qualitative historical research with econometric and statistical analysis. 
Fagerberg (1994, p.1155) states that “the literature on technology-gap fits very well the 
description of an appreciative’ theory”, which according to Nelson and Winter (1982, 
p.5) “generally will refer to observed empirical relationships, but go beyond them, and 
lay a causal interpretation on them”. In this respect, growth regressions in technology-
gap models do not lead directly to the identification of causal mechanisms and 
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generative processes, but they just point out the stylised facts on which the researcher 
will then try to build up ex-post causal explanations. Econometric work and qualitative 
historical analysis are both regarded as necessary aspects of evolutionary research. 
 
The close interaction between theoretical and empirical research and the combination of 
statistical-econometric analysis with case study-based historical investigation certainly 
represent important methodological characteristics of evolutionary growth theorising. 
However, the co-existence of different methodologies in the various strands of current 
evolutionary research is not unproblematic. There is one strand of evolutionary scholars, 
in particular, that makes greater use of formal modelling techniques (Silverberg and 
Verspagen, 2003). Northover (1999) observes that these Nelson and Winter-like 
modelling exercises show traces of ‘latent positivism’ in evolutionary economics, and 
therefore reveal a methodological tension in the evolutionary framework. This tension, 
it is argued, originates from Nelson and Winter’s (1982) distinction between formal and 
appreciative theorising, which shows a hidden dialectic between a positivist and a 
realist position in their evolutionary view of economic change. She therefore states:  
 
I seriously question and indeed reject Nelson and Winter’s self-imposed positivistic methodological 
constraints - viz., formalism - as being integral to a new research paradigm in pursuit of a new field of 
vision. Indeed, this positivistic methodological position, rather than facilitating the fullest pursuit of the 
‘Kuhnian puzzles’ in their research programme, establishes arbitrary and untenable limits for the 
advancement of knowledge (Northover, 1999, p.58). 
 
This criticism to Nelson and Winter’s methodological position points to an important 
challenge to the critical realist interpretation of evolutionary economics that this paper is 
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proposing. Critical realism, in fact, criticizes the use of formal models because these 
imply the adoption of a deductive mode of reasoning that aims at identifying constant 
conjuctions of events - ‘whenever this then that’. But universal laws can never be found 
in a complex, uncertain and ever-changing social realm, so formal modelling exercises 
do not lead to the advancement of knowledge about economic real processes. For this 
reason, critical realists argue, Nelson and Winter’s claim that formal theorising 
constitutes an important complement to appreciative research does implicitly show the 
existence of a dialectic between a positivist and a realist position in evolutionary 
economics. 
Such a criticism is relevant in relation to Nelson and Winter’s (1982) original work, but 
it becomes less challenging if it is referred to the more recent developments in the field 
of evolutionary economics. This is the case for two main reasons. First, section 2 has 
shown that evolutionary modelling is not the only wave of modern evolutionary 
theorising, and certainly not the most important. The advances of evolutionary 
economics in the last two decades suggest that appreciative studies have proved to be 
much more influential than formal modelling for the development of the field. In a 
dynamic perspective, then, it is not so important to focus on the positivist features of  
Nelson and Winter-like formal models. Rather, it is relevant to point out that the 
evolutionary field seems to be increasingly moving in a critical realist direction, where 
formal theorising looses ground, and appreciative research tends to become more 
influential over time. Recent advances in evolutionary economics have therefore mostly 
been led by an increasing use of the retroductive model of explanation related to 
appreciative theorising, rather than by the use of deductive reasoning implied in formal 
modelling exercises.  
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Secondly, recent developments suggest that the methodological tension between 
evolutionary formal modelling and appreciative research may be less dramatic today 
than Northover (1999) suggested with reference to the original wave of Nelson and 
Winter-like formal models. There in fact exists some ground to reconsider the role of 
evolutionary formal modelling in light of the recent development of the new class of 
history-friendly models (Malerba et alia, 1999). This type of modelling exercises 
represents a significant methodological change in the evolutionary framework, and its 
future extension and generalization could therefore lead to a novel interpretation of the 
role of formal theorising, that could possibly be more consistent with the methodology 
of critical realism. 
History-friendly modelling exercises are carried out in four subsequent steps. The first 
is the phase in which appreciative theorising identifies an interesting demi-reg (e.g. the 
long-run evolution of the computer industry in the original exercise of Malerba et alia, 
1999), and puts forward an accurate and context-specific explanation of its underlying 
generative process. Such an explanation is thus based on the retroductive type of 
reasoning described above. Secondly, a formal model is built up with the purpose of 
reproducing that particular demi-reg through the use of an analytical model solved by 
computer simulations. The model, in this methodology, is built up ex-post in order to 
reproduce real and context-specific stylised facts, not to deduce analytical results from 
unrealistic assumptions. Its purpose is therefore neither to identify a constant conjuction 
of events nor to predict a future state of affairs. It simply constitutes a learning game for 
the analyst, who uses it to check the logical consistency of the appreciative theorising 
previously developed. Thirdly, additional simulation exercises are carried out with the 
purpose of constructing history-divergent scenarios. That is to say, changes in the 
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model’s parameters generate artificial outcomes that deviate from the observed trend or 
stylized fact. The purpose of this phase is to explore the effects of systematic factors 
(generative mechanisms) and random events (context-specific and contingent factors) 
on the model’s outcomes. Once again, this is a learning game for the analyst, but it does 
not imply the identification of any causal law or empirical regularity.  
We suggest here a fourth phase of this type of methodology that could in the future 
enable a greater extension and generalization of the class of history-friendly models, as 
well as a stronger consistency with the critical realist methodology. This additional 
phase would consist of repeating the whole exercise (i.e. the previous three steps) for 
analysing a similar demi-reg or stylized fact in a different historical-geographical 
context. In other words, using Lawson’s methodology of contrastive demi-regs, the 
researcher could build up two history-friendly models to reproduce the evolution of, 
say, the computer industry in two different countries. This would make it possible to 
formulate the critical realist research question: why has the same industry experienced a 
different evolution in these countries? The comparative analysis of these contrastive 
demi-regs would thus call for further appreciative research to shed new light on the 
underlying generative mechanism. This would in turn stimulate the subsequent 
development of additional history-friendly models for analysing the case of other 
countries, therefore fostering a process of continuous interaction between empirical and 
theoretical work, qualitative and quantitative research, appreciative and formal 
theorising. 
In short, the development of history-friendly modelling exercises suggests that formal 
theorising may indeed play a relevant role in the evolutionary framework, provided that 
it is not used to identify constant conjuctions of events in a closed system, but rather to 
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check the logical consistency of appreciative theorising about real mechanisms in the 
open economic world. 
 
4.3 Interdisciplinarity  
In critical realism, interdisciplinarity is a necessary consequence of the open-system 
character of the social realm. Given that the social system is a complex interrelated 
whole, it cannot be studied by dividing it into its component parts, so that the positivist 
separation into different sub-systems and different disciplines is artificial and 
unnecessary.  
The same methodological position with regards to interdisciplinarity is explicitly 
supported by all the streams of evolutionary theorising developed in the last two 
decades. In an appraisal of the recent developments of evolutionary economics, Nelson 
and Winter (2002, p.42) conclude: 
 
the citations to our 1982 book suggest that the evolutionary approach has had broad appeal to a wide 
range of scholars from a variety of different disciplines [...]. Evolutionary economics therefore has open 
frontiers, lives with other disciplines in what is recognizably the same intellectual world and has much to 
offer and to gain from trade. 
 
As observed by Nelson (1998), appreciative theorising outside of the economic domain 
(particularly on technological, business and institutional history) tends to be closely 
related to the development of evolutionary economic studies. Analytical explanations 
are not only empirically well founded on robust economic stylised facts, but they are 
also built up in close connection to the appreciative theorising and empirical results 
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obtained in other related disciplines in the social sciences. Evolutionary research on 
human cognition, firms and organizations is a clear example of the fruitful interactions 
that evolutionary economics may have with cognitive psychology, business and 
organization studies. 
Interdisciplinarity is a cross-cutting theme in evolutionary economics. At the 
microeconomic level, based on the concepts of routines and habits of thought, a theory 
of innovation needs to be open to other disciplines in the social sciences. Cognitive 
psychology could shed some light on the mechanisms of human cognition, learning and 
the formation of routines and habits of thought of individuals, while organization and 
business studies could help to understand the collective and interactional aspects of 
innovative activities within and between organizations. At the macroeconomic level, on 
the other hand, the development of an evolutionary theory of institutional change will 
only be possible by looking outside of the economic domain, that is in particular at 
economic sociology, political science and history.  
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5. Conclusions 
 
Evolutionary growth theorising has rapidly developed since 1982, year in which some 
of the most important contributions in the field were simultaneously published, by Dosi, 
Freeman, Nelson and Winter, and Rosenberg. There now exists a large consensus on the 
fact that the different strands of evolutionary economics flourished in the last two 
decades can be regarded as different research traditions within the same (broadly 
defined) evolutionary paradigm. According to most evolutionary scholars, there is a 
common core linking together the different streams of evolutionary growth theorising. 
Taking a similar point of view, section 2 has presented a brief overview of the field, in 
order to outline the main theoretical building blocks of evolutionary economics. 
This has led to the question: does there also exist a philosophical and methodological 
common core of the evolutionary paradigm? Foss (1994), Vromen (1995), Northover 
(1999) and Lawson (2003) have previously suggested that the philosophy and 
methodology of science behind the evolutionary theory of economic change point to 
important connections with critical realism. Based on these previous contributions, the 
paper has explored further the critical realist foundations of evolutionary economics.  
Section 3 has focused on the ontology described in the evolutionary approach. From an 
ontological point of view, there are four important reasons to sustain a critical realist 
interpretation. (i) The evolutionary ontology is complex, differentiated and stratified, 
due to the persistent heterogeneity of individuals, firms, sectors and countries. It is the 
complex chain of feedbacks and relationships among economic agents at different levels 
of aggregation that gives such a systemic and structured character to the evolutionary 
world. (ii) A transformational model of social action tends to be implicitly adopted by 
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evolutionary scholars, in the often claimed search for a non-reductionist theory in which 
economic entities at different levels of aggregation co-evolve and interact. (iii) The 
focus of the evolutionary metaphor is not on constant conjuctions of events in a closed 
system, as in neoclassical economics, but on continuous change and transformation in 
an open one. (iv) ‘Strong’ and pervasive uncertainty is an intrinsic characteristic of the 
evolutionary ontology. Economic growth is conceived as a non-predictable and non-
deterministic process because fundamental sources of uncertainty exist in a complex, 
structured and ever-changing evolutionary system.  
Section 4 has then shifted the focus to some important methodological aspects which, in 
our view, may also support a critical realist interpretation of evolutionary growth 
theorising. In this respect, three points have been discussed. (i) An implicit connection 
to the methodology of critical realism is reflected in the repeatedly claimed search for 
the evolutionary process which generates economic growth and transformation in 
specific historical and geographical contexts. The committment to the investigation of 
reality is combined with the acknowledgement of its complex, ever-changing and non-
deterministic character, so that causal mechanisms are investigated but can never be 
formalized in terms of universal laws or models. (ii) The concept of appreciative 
theorising constitutes the link between evolutionary theory and applied work, between 
quantitative and qualitative methods. Retroduction, the critical realist alternative to 
induction and deduction, is the way in which appreciative theorising is developed, thus 
constituting the link between formal theory and applied work, between quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of economic growth. The recent class of history-friendly models 
shows how such an evolutionary methodology works in practice. The article has 
suggested that the future generalization of this type of exercise would strengthen even 
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further the critical realist features of the evolutionary methodology. (iii) 
Interdisciplinarity, at different levels of analysis, is a necessary consequence of the open 
character of the evolutionary world.  
 
On the whole, by focusing on such ontological and methodological characteristics of the 
evolutionary view, the article has shown that a critical realist interpretation of 
evolutionary growth theorising is both possible and desirable. It is possible, because 
there already exist several important elements supporting the connections between 
critical realism and evolutionary economics. It is desirable, because the critical realist 
discourse may provide a more solid philosophical and methodological foundation for 
the future development of evolutionary economics. 
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Notes 
 
1 Peter (2001) discusses the different interpretations of critical realism in economics. 
For a discussion and definition of the different forms of realism, see Northover (1999). 
 
2 Nelson and Winter (1982) point out that within each firm, production can be 
conceived as guided by routines at different levels, driving the standard operating 
procedures, the investment behaviour, and the deliberate search for new routines when 
the old ones prove to give unsatisfactory results in terms of market shares and profits. 
 
3 For a review of the literature on innovation and catching-up, see Fagerberg and 
Godinho (2005). 
 
4 See Malerba (2002) and (2005). 
 
5 From a critical realist perspective, the use of the institution as a basic unit of analysis 
is however not unproblematic. For a more in-depth discussion of this point, see Lawson, 
2003. 
 
6 See Silverberg and Verspagen (2003) for an overview of evolutionary formal models. 
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